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Executive Summary 
 This study seeks to estimate the effect of disasters on the total receipts and total spending 
of county governments in Kentucky. In addition to estimating the effects of disasters on total 
receipts and total spending, this study also seeks to estimate the effects of disasters on specific 
categories of revenue (taxes, intergovernmental, etc.) and spending (transportation, recreation, 
general government, etc.).  These effects are estimated using data on county budgets for 2007 
through 2017 from the Kentucky Department for Local Government (DLG) and data on disaster 
declarations and public assistance grants from FEMA.   
 The principle findings of this study suggest that: 
• Disaster damage in the previous fiscal year is associated with an increase in total receipts 
per capita in the current fiscal year. 
• There is no statistically significant relationship between disaster damage and total 
spending per capita. 
• Disaster damage is associated with a decrease in tax revenues in the current fiscal year 
and an increase in intergovernmental revenues in the following fiscal year. 
• Disaster damage is associated with a decrease in recreation and culture spending per 
capita in the current fiscal year and an increase in transportation spending per capita in 
the following fiscal year.  
 Overall, the results of this study suggest that the effects of disasters on local government 
budgets are not large.  The small changes induced by average levels of disaster damage should 
be reasonably manageable by local governments given the amount of assistance available from 
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the state and federal government, however, damage well above average amounts does have the 
capacity to create large responses and strain the budgets of local governments.  
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Introduction 
 Economic losses from natural hazards in the United States have been steadily increasing 
since the 1960’s (Cutter & Emrich, 2005).  As the so-called built environment has grown in the 
United States, the potential for disaster losses has grown as well.  In the United States, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) declared disasters in 137 counties, parishes, 
or tribal territories in 2017 (FEMA, 2019).  The increase in hazard and disaster losses and 
disaster declarations is an issue of key importance for governments at the federal, state, and local 
levels in the United States.  All levels of government have a role to play in disaster response and 
recovery, but disasters are experienced at a local level and thus require immediate action by local 
governments. 
 The response of local governments to disasters affects the recovery of communities that 
have experienced disasters.  While local governments must deal with the initial ramifications, 
state governments also have a role to play.  It is the responsible of state governors to request 
disaster declarations from FEMA.  Additionally, state governments typically provide a 
substantial portion of local government revenues and place guidelines and restrictions on local 
government duties.  The federal government also plays an instrumental role in the disaster 
process.  The U.S. President must declare that a disaster exists in order to make funds from 
FEMA available to affected communities.  FEMA funds are an important source of financial 
assistance for governments and communities affected by disasters. 
 FEMA funds consist primarily of three grant programs: public assistance, individual 
assistance, and hazard mitigation.  When a disaster is declared, the President’s declaration will 
specify which grant programs will be available.  The public assistance program makes funds 
available to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to assist with debris 
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removal, protective measures, infrastructure repair, and other projects associated with disasters.  
The individual assistance program provides funds for individuals and households to cover 
expenses associated with temporary housing, home repair, disaster-caused medical care, and 
other needs resulting from a disaster.  The hazard mitigation program provides funds for 
communities to enact mitigation measures with the goal of reducing future disaster losses. 
 There are generally four phases associated with natural disaster management: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery.  This study will be concerned primarily with the response 
and recovery phases.  Table 1 summarizes the responsibilities and challenges faced by local 
governments in each phase of the disaster management process (Kusumasari et al., 2010).  One 
of the key challenges faced at each phase of the disaster management process is constrained 
budgets.  As such, determining what effects disasters typically have on budgets (both revenue 
sources and spending) will provide important information for local government officials.   
 The composition and duties of local government can vary from state to state.  As such, 
this study will focus on county governments in Kentucky.  This should be especially interesting 
since county governments in Kentucky are extensions of the state government.  With Kentucky’s 
state government experiencing financial difficulties, this constrains the direct assistance the state 
can provide to localities in the event of disaster.   
 This study will considers counties rather than cities because there are 419 cities in 
Kentucky ranging in population from less than ten to over 500,000.  Additionally, the role and 
duties of cities varies drastically with size.  Counties are a convenient unit of analysis because 
the state government defines their roles explicitly and they follow a uniform system of 
accounting.  Fayette and Jefferson counties are excluded from this analysis due to their unique 
status as urban-county governments (combining city and county).   
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Table 1 – Stages, Responsibilities, and Challenges of Disaster Management 
Disaster Stage Responsibilities Key Challenges 
Mitigation Evaluation, monitoring, and 
dissemination 
Low public awareness, low 
commitment of government 
Preparedness Planning, exercise, and training Inadequate early warning 
system, constrained budgets 
Response Need assessment, information exchange, 
and logistical expertise 
Communication, coordination, 
inadequate public information, 
volunteer help 
Recovery Damage assessment, debris removal, and 
disaster assistance skills 
Budget constraints, lack of 
expertise, and central 
government control 
 
 In order to inform the effects of disasters on county government budgets in Kentucky, 
this study will seek to estimate the effect of disasters on the total receipts and total spending of 
county governments.   In addition to estimating the effects of disasters on total receipts and total 
spending, this study will also seek to estimate the effects of disasters on specific categories of 
revenue (taxes, intergovernmental, etc.) and spending (transportation, recreation, general 
government, etc.).  These effects will be estimated using data on county budgets for 2007 
through 2017 from the Kentucky Department for Local Government (DLG) and data on disaster 
declarations from FEMA.  The statistical method employed by this study will be ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression.  Fixed effects of counties will be utilized to take advantage of the 
panel structure of the data.   
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 In addition to identifying the budget effects of disasters, this study will provide detail on 
what the possible implications of these effects may be.  The results of this study will have 
implications for policy-makers at the state and federal levels as well as the local level.  For 
example, if the study finds that intergovernmental transfers offset all local spending increases, 
this would demonstrate that the state and federal governments are bearing the full cost of 
disasters.  As another example, if we find that local governments have to cut spending for several 
categories in order to remove debris and repair infrastructure, we may be interested in thinking 
about the long-term effects that these cuts to other categories may have. 
Literature Review 
  There are primarily three areas of literature relevant for this study.  The first is concerned 
with the role of local governments in the disaster management process.  In order to determine the 
effects of disasters on local government finances, a defined role for local government is 
necessary.  The second area of literature is concerned with estimating the effects of disasters on a 
variety of outcomes.  This literature will influence the research design and methodology for this 
study.  The third area of literature is concerned with the modelling of state and local government 
expenditures.  This literature is important for this study because it provides an idea of what 
variables may need to be controlled. 
The Role of Local Government in Disaster Management 
 It can be difficult to define the role of local government in disaster management because 
perceptions may differ between citizens and public officials.  Using interview data from 29 
public officials and 64 “active citizens” from The Flood Recovery Task Force and The Flood 
Victim’s Action Council, Wolensky & Miller (1981) concluded that perceptions of the role of 
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local governments did indeed differ between citizens and officials. While active citizens and 
local government officials considered the “everyday” role of officials to be merely custodial, 
citizens expected local government officials to take an “active” role in disaster response while 
officials considered their role in disaster response to be “custodial”.  In addition, there is 
evidence that the rebuilding decisions of citizens affected by disasters are driven by their 
perceptions of government’s intent and capacity to assist in the rebuilding process (Chamlee-
Wright & Storr, 2009). 
 Since citizens have expectations of government response that differ from the expectations 
of government officials, voters may attempt to hold public officials accountable for disasters. 
Generally, voters tend to reelect incumbents when economic conditions are good and vote them 
out when conditions are poor (Healy & Malhotra, 2009).  There is evidence that voters hold local 
public officials responsible for disasters (by voting against them) when they believe the local 
government is responsible for disaster preparation (Arceneaux and Stein, 2006).  Healy & 
Malhotra (2009) demonstrate that voters reward the political party of the incumbent U.S. 
President for disaster relief spending.  The authors also find that voters do not reward a political 
party for investing in disaster preparedness spending and argue that this distorts the incentives of 
public officials and leads to underinvestment in disaster preparedness. 
 The role of local government in disaster response actually varies quite substantially 
across states; however, “state and local governments are generally responsible for all phases of 
disaster management.” (Col, 2007, 115) Since 1978, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) has taken on an increasing role in the task of assisting state and local 
governments, particularly when events “overwhelm” state and local governments.  In 1979, 
President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order that merged six other disaster response 
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agencies including The Federal Insurance Administration, The National Fire Prevention and 
Control Administration, and others with FEMA.  FEMA has since been absorbed by the 
Department of Homeland Security and responsibility for disasters has been further centralized at 
the federal level. 
 “The first few hours following any large-scale disaster present a complex array of 
organizational demands that constitute a unique managerial problem.” (Drabek, 1985, 85)  The 
nature and type of disaster determines which organizations must respond and which tasks they 
will confront.  In 1984, the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) was 
implemented in the U.S. at all levels of government. The goal of IEMS was to move towards a 
model of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM), a generalized approach to disaster 
management (Drabek, 1985).  CEM applies to all four phases of disasters (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery and refers to a government’s responsibility to coordinate 
the actions of numerous agencies in managing disasters.  
 IEMS is related to an increase in federal assistance provided to local governments in the 
aftermath of disasters.  The processes for intergovernmental communication and collaboration 
have become more well-defined.  As such, “After a major disaster, local officials are involved in 
complex intergovernmental processes and in key public policy choices that affect the future of 
the community (Rubin & Barbee, 1985).  This puts a lot of pressure on local officials and 
managers to make good decisions and lead communities in recovery.  
 Waugh & Streib (2006) stress the importance of an effective leadership strategy in 
responding to disasters. The authors contrast a command and control leadership strategy with a 
more open and democratic strategy.  A command and control strategy can lead to faster, more 
consistent decision-making; however, a more open and democratic strategy can lead to better 
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communication.  Ultimately, the authors call for a flexible leadership style in handling disaster 
response.  Harrald (2006) points to improvisation, adaptability, and creativity as being critical 
success factors for leaders faced with a disaster. 
Estimating the Effect of Disasters on Outcomes 
 While I can find no literature in which researchers estimated the effect of disasters on 
local government finances, recent literature seeks to estimate the effects of disasters on a variety 
of outcomes using a variety of empirical methods.  Noy & Nualsri (2011) estimated the effect of 
disasters (by magnitude) on several fiscal outcomes of countries (government consumption, 
revenue, payment, cash surplus, and debt) using a panel VAR specification. Cavallo & 
Borensztein (2007) considered the effects of hurricanes on the debt-to-GDP ratio of local 
governments conditional on amount of disaster insurance by conducting a debt sustainability 
analysis.  Noy & Vu (2010) estimated the impacts of specific disasters on annual output growth 
in Vietnam using a Blundell-Bond GMM estimator.   
 Strobl (2011) estimated the impact of hurricanes on local economic growth rates and per 
capita wealth in coastal counties in the United States.  This methodology is particularly relevant 
for this study because it is concerned with counties in the United States.  The author developed a 
hurricane destruction index in order to account for the varying levels of damage of which 
hurricanes are capable.  Cavallo & Galiani (2010) estimated the effects of severe natural 
disasters on country-level GDP per capita using synthetic controls to construct a counterfactual 
trend.   
 Deryugina (2016) used an event study approach to determine the effects of hurricanes in 
the United States on non-disaster government transfers.  The author found that hurricanes 
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actually increase government transfers for unemployment insurance and public medical 
payments.  Kirchberger (2017) used an instrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of 
earthquakes on labor market outcomes (wages, employment status, and hours worked).  Zhao et 
al. (2018) used a difference-in-difference specification to estimate the effect of a major 
earthquake on county-city-level GDP and GDP per capita in China. 
 Two conclusions can be drawn from the literature on the effects of natural disasters.  The 
first is that there is a gap when it comes to the effect of disasters on local fiscal outcomes.  More 
research is needed to identify these effects.  The second conclusion is that a number of methods 
have been applied to estimate these effects, each with distinct strengths and weaknesses. 
Modelling State and Local Government Expenditure 
 Fisher (1961) suggested that the variables necessary for estimating state and local 
government expenditure are population density, urbanity of the population, and per capita 
income.  Using data from the 1957 Census of Governments, Fisher was able to explain a 
substantial amount of the variation in the level of state government spending using these three 
factors. 
 Sacks and Harris (1964) suggested adding state and federal government aid to this 
equation for estimating local government expenditure.  The authors were similarly able to 
explain a large amount of variation with a model including only the five variables.  Osman 
(1968) outlined three objections to the use of state and federal aid in these models.  The first is 
that aid may be distributed evenly to lower levels of government from higher levels and would 
simply become a part of the constant term.  The second objection is that aid from state and 
federal governments depends on expenditures by the local government (e.g. matching grants).  
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The third and final objection discussed by Osman is that aid may no longer be an important 
determinant of spending once the reverse-caused portion of it is removed. 
 The aforementioned studies were primarily concerned with modelling levels of 
expenditures.  Bahl and Saunders (1965) were interested in modelling changes in expenditures.  
The model employed by these authors included changes in per capita income, population density, 
urban population, federal grants, and public school enrollment as determinants of changes in 
state government expenditure. 
Research Design 
Goals and Empirical Strategy  
 This study seeks to estimate the effects of FEMA declared disasters on county 
government revenues and spending in Kentucky. To this end, I will statistically analyze the 
budgets of 118 Kentucky county governments from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2017 
using OLS.   This analysis excludes Fayette and Jefferson counties due to their unique structure 
as urban-county governments.  In order to determine the effects of disasters on total receipts and 
total spending, a number of equations are estimated.  The most direct of these is as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
 In this specification, c denotes county while t denotes fiscal year.  Y represents either total 
receipts per capita or total spending per capita.  X represents a vector of control variables (per 
capita income, unemployment, vote share, and population density).  County fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐) are 
included to control for unobserved time-invariant factors that may affect the outcomes across 
counties.  In this equation, Disasters is the count of FEMA-declared disasters in a county in a 
given year.  As an alternative, a similar model is also estimated including each unique count as a 
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binary variable (OneDisaster = 1 if a county experienced one disaster in a given year, 
TwoDisasters = 1 if a county experienced two disasters in a given year, continued up to 
FourDisasters since four is the maximum number of disasters experienced by any one county in 
any year in this data.)   
 Since disasters vary drastically in nature and in damage that they cause, it is difficult and 
perhaps unreasonable to characterize the average disaster.  As such, this study will also consider 
the following specification: 
𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹_𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
Where FEMA_PA represents the per capita public assistance grant funding approved by FEMA.  
Public assistance grant funding (PA) is used as a proxy for disaster damage or magnitude.  While 
there may be some variation in grants awarded based on the ability of grant-writers in a county, 
PA grant funding is still the most reasonable proxy for disaster damage available. 
 This specification using public assistance grants as a proxy for damage will be the 
specification used to identify the effects of disasters on specific categories of revenues and 
spending.  The following revenue categories will be considered: 
• Tax revenues  
• Intergovernmental revenues  
• Borrowing   
 In addition to estimating the effects of disasters on these revenue categories, the effects of 
disasters on the following spending categories are also estimated: 
 General Government 
 Protection to Persons and Property 
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 General Health and Sanitation 
 Social Services 
 Recreation and Culture 
 Roads and Transportation 
 Capital Projects 
 Administration 
Expectations  
 The expectations of this study are intuitive.  Since a Presidential Disaster Declaration 
makes counties eligible for public assistance funds (and other grant programs) through FEMA, I 
expect that the occurrence of at least one disaster will increase total revenues and total spending 
(in per capita terms). Additionally, I expect that the magnitude of this effect will be larger as 
more disasters occur within one fiscal year.  Formally, this can be expressed as ( 0 < 𝛽𝛽1 < 𝛽𝛽2 <
𝛽𝛽3) for all Ys considered. 
 For the specific categories of revenues and spending, I expect the following: 
Category Expected Change in Response to Disasters 
Tax Revenues Decrease 
Intergovernmental Revenues Increase 
Borrowing Increase 
General Government Increase 
Protection to Persons and Property Increase 
General Health and Sanitation Increase 
Social Services Increase 
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Recreation and Culture Decrease 
Roads and Transportation Increase 
Capital Projects No Change 
Administration Decrease 
 
 The results of this analysis may be of great interest to policymakers at varying levels of 
government.  The resulting estimates will allow us to determine the balance of revenue and 
spending responses by local governments.  For example, my expectation is that total receipts and 
total spending will both increase because of a disaster.  If this expectation is correct, we will 
have an estimate of the amount by which both increase.  If the results suggest that spending 
increases more than revenues because of a disaster, this could imply that counties are saving an 
adequate amount for disasters.  If the results suggest that revenues increase more than spending 
because of a disaster, this might imply that the inflow of new funds (likely through 
intergovernmental transfers or borrowing) exceeds the amount actually needed to offset the costs 
of disasters.  In other words, it would suggest that counties are receiving new funds but spending 
additional funds. 
Data 
 The county budget data used in this study are from the Kentucky Department for Local 
Government (DLG).  These data contain detailed information on the revenues and spending of 
118 county governments in Kentucky for fiscal years 2007 to 2017.  There are only eight missing 
budgets (county-year combinations) and no more than two missing budgets for any given year.  
For this study, I aggregate the data from line-item detail up to total spending and revenues and to 
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totals for general categories of spending and revenues using accounting codes from the County 
Budget Preparation and State Local Finance Officer Policy Manual (Kentucky DLG, 2017).   
 In order to put the budget variables in per capita terms, I use Census Bureau midyear 
population estimates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  I use these same population 
estimates to calculate per capita personal income using data on personal income from the BEA 
and to calculate population density (supplemented with land area information from the U.S. 
Census Bureau).  In addition to these variables, I use local area unemployment data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for a measure of the county-level unemployment rate.  I also 
utilize data from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2018) on county presidential election 
returns from 2000 through 2016 to construct a measure of vote-share to account for political 
factors.  Vote-share reflects the political ideology in a given county and may lead to variations in 
budget activity. 
 For the variables of interest (disasters), I use FEMA’s disaster declarations database.  The 
FEMA data contains some detail for each disaster declared, including relevant dates, grant 
programs made available, a brief description of the disaster, and an indication of type of disaster.  
The disaster types that occurred in Kentucky during the period of analysis include fire, floods, 
storms, ice, and snow.  The following tables contains summary statistics for the variables 
discussed: 
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Receipts 1288 $579.98 $253.76 $69.48 $2,087.32 
Tax Revenue 1288 $140.33 $80.61 $2.40 $1,050.78 
Intergovernmental Revenue 1288 $212.98 $129.25 $0.00 $1,038.80 
Borrowing 1288 $10.53 $60.37 $0.00 $1,304.34 
Total Spending 1288 $435.10 $177.82 $12.14 $2,053.27 
General Government 1288 $77.28 $51.87 $1.72 $1,321.88 
Protection to Persons and Prop. 1288 $98.75 $58.18 $2.14 $643.58 
General Health and Sanitation 1288 $28.52 $41.21 $0.00 $828.89 
Social Services 1288 $6.01 $11.06 $0.00 $135.07 
Recreation and Culture 1288 $12.25 $15.50 $0.00 $180.72 
Roads and Transportation 1288 $88.71 $52.00 $0.00 $441.67 
Capital Projects 1288 $22.20 $45.89 $0.00 $527.72 
Administration 1288 $77.00 $42.62 $5.33 $669.95 
 Categories will not add up to totals because several revenue categories and one spending 
category (debt service) are excluded. 
Analysis  
 The results from estimating my equations with total receipts per capita as the dependent 
variable are reported in the following table: 
 
 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Disasters 1292 0.53 0.84 0 4 
PA Per Capita 1290 $9.24 $31.04 $0.00 $496.35 
Population 1290 28171.33 26831.88 2134 165399 
Population per square mile 1289 95.30 122.74 18.66 1032.13 
Per Capita Income 1290 $2,897.26 $5,026.01 $17,384.46 $61,565.74 
Unemployment 1292 8.36 2.88 3.3 20.5 
Democratic Vote Share (0 -
100) 1292 31.75 9.49 8.75 69.8 
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Dependent Variable - Total Receipts (Per Capita) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Count of Disasters -7.816* -2.016     
 (4.332) (7.347)     
Count of Disasters (Lag) 3.087 0.573     
 (4.291) (8.681)     
One Disaster   -6.983 0.220   
   (8.802) (9.362)   
Two Disasters   -23.02** -6.943   
   (11.60) (22.40)   
Three Disasters   -9.682 9.643   
   (15.75) (25.25)   
Four Disasters   -29.38 -12.49   
   (39.63) (44.72)   
One Disaster (Lag)   2.397 6.515   
   (9.922) (12.17)   
Two Disasters (Lag)   -25.56** -42.40*   
   (11.52) (23.26)   
Three Disasters (Lag)   49.90*** 31.21   
   (18.26) (32.23)   
Four Disasters (Lag)   -15.42 -37.07   
   (50.42) (59.52)   
FEMA PA per Capita     -0.0193 0.0555 
     (0.146) (0.150) 
FEMA PA per Capita (Lag)     0.867* 0.926* 
     (0.501) (0.558) 
Constant 535.8*** 603.1*** 527.6*** 596.2*** 548.4*** 608.3*** 
 (151.1) (168.6) (154.2) (173.5) (153.8) (166.5) 
       
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,164 1,164 
R-squared 0.010 0.019 0.020 0.031 0.056 0.067 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
       
* All models estimated using county fixed effects and controlling for population density, unemployment, vote-
share, and income 
 Columns (1) and (2) report the results where the explanatory variable is the count of 
disasters.  Even numbered columns are estimated using year fixed effects.  The results from 
columns (1) and (2) suggest that there may be a negative relationship between disasters in the 
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current fiscal year and current year receipts and a positive relationship between disasters in the 
previous fiscal year and current year receipts.  These results are not statistically significant at the 
95% level and they provide no statistical evidence.  
 Columns (3) and (4) report the results when the explanatory variables are binary variables 
for each count of disasters.  These results are inconsistent and somewhat confusing.  
Additionally, all statistical significance (at the 95% level) goes away when year fixed effects are 
included.  Overall, the results in columns (1) through (4) do not provide convincing evidence that 
the count of disasters is associated with changes in per capita total receipts.  These models also 
fail to explain a substantial portion of the variation in per capita receipts. 
 The estimates in columns (5) and (6) were calculated using per capita approved FEMA 
public assistance grant funds as the explanatory variable.  These results suggest that current-year 
disaster damage has no relationship with current-year receipts.  This is a reasonable result as 
there are administrative frictions in place that prevent immediate changes to show up.  There is 
some evidence (significant at the 90% confidence level) that previous year disaster damage is 
associated with an increase in current-year per capita receipts.  
 The estimates in (5) and (6) suggest that for each dollar in disaster damage in the 
previous fiscal year, there is an increase in current year per capita receipts of between $.87 and 
$.93.  This result could reflect two things.  First, it might reflect that the counties are actually 
receiving the public assistance funds (subject to a federal cost share) one year after the disaster(s) 
occur.  Second, it could reflect that receipts are increasing as a result of increases in borrowing or 
other revenue sources.  The models that estimate the effects of damage on specific revenue 
categories will help to disentangle this. 
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 The results from estimating my equations with total spending per capita as the dependent 
variable are reported in the following table: 
Dependent Variable - Total Spending (Per Capita) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Count of Disasters -8.933** -2.929     
 (3.940) (4.825)     
Count of Disasters (Lag) 2.549 0.887     
 (2.991) (4.758)     
One Disaster   -3.627 2.674   
   (8.343) (8.078)   
Two Disasters   -15.53* 1.928   
   (9.175) (12.22)   
Three Disasters   -19.99 1.807   
   (13.53) (18.62)   
Four Disasters   -63.55* -43.59   
   (36.55) (37.33)   
One Disaster (Lag)   6.039 7.658   
   (7.582) (9.176)   
Two Disasters (Lag)   
-
21.80*** 
-
33.80***   
   (7.974) (11.61)   
Three Disasters (Lag)   37.03** 25.97   
   (14.51) (19.70)   
Four Disasters (Lag)   -18.09 -32.09   
   (27.12) (31.68)   
FEMA PA per Capita     -0.105 -0.0334 
     (0.139) (0.152) 
FEMA PA per Capita (Lag)     0.786 0.849 
     (0.513) (0.572) 
Constant 424.8*** 473.7*** 419.7*** 468.5*** 431.7*** 477.8*** 
 (82.45) (89.93) (81.68) (89.70) (84.99) (87.01) 
       
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,164 1,164 
R-squared 0.012 0.022 0.021 0.034 0.067 0.082 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
       
* All models estimated using county fixed effects and controlling for population density, unemployment, vote-
share, and income 
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 For the sake of clarity, I will focus on the results reported in columns (5) and (6).  These 
results suggest that there is no relationship between current or previous year damage and current 
year spending.  This result is interesting because if the results from the total receipts models are 
to be believed, this would suggest that county government surpluses are increasing because of 
disaster damage.  This could happen for at least two reasons.  The first is that counties are 
opportunistic and take advantage of the availability of FEMA grant funds to increase revenues.  
The second is that counties may cut spending from various categories to supplement disaster 
relief funding.  The models that estimate the effects of damage on specific spending categories 
will help to detail what is occurring. 
 The results from estimating my equations with revenue categories (per capita) as 
dependent variables are reported in the following table: 
Dependent Variables - Revenue Categories 
 
 Taxes Intergovernmental Borrowing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
FEMA PA per Capita -0.0194 -0.0441* -0.212* -0.185 0.0371 0.0677 
 (0.0167) (0.0250) (0.113) (0.116) (0.0595) (0.0542) 
FEMA PA per Capita (Lag) -0.0317 -0.0716 0.232** 0.222** 0.0556 0.0810 
 (0.0332) (0.0542) (0.108) (0.110) (0.0704) (0.0640) 
       
Constant 279.1*** 301.2*** 144.3*** 231.9*** -2.745 -59.16 
 (90.29) (97.14) (54.96) (53.19) (43.01) (45.37) 
       
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 
R-squared 0.026 0.040 0.052 0.095 0.004 0.015 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
       
* All models estimated using county fixed effects and controlling for population density, unemployment, 
vote-share, and income 
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 These results suggest that tax revenues decrease by $.044 per capita for each dollar in per 
capita damage in the current fiscal year.  Additionally, the results suggest each dollar in per 
capita damage in the previous fiscal year is associated with a $.222 per capita increase in 
intergovernmental revenues.  There appears to be no significant relationship between borrowing 
and disaster damage.   
 The significant results from estimating my equations with spending categories (per 
capita) as dependent variables are reported in the following table: 
Dependent Variables - Spending Categories 
 
 Rec & Culture Transportation Administration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
FEMA PA per Capita -0.0143** -0.0131** -0.0713*** -0.0331 -0.0359* -0.0229 
 (0.00615) (0.00615) (0.0261) (0.0277) (0.0193) (0.0203) 
FEMA PA per Capita (Lag) 0.00165 -0.00314 0.172*** 0.172*** -0.0124 -0.00841 
 (0.00831) (0.00974) (0.0552) (0.0571) (0.0139) (0.0160) 
Constant -1.946 2.195 51.07* 84.62*** 149.8*** 164.1*** 
 (10.46) (10.75) (27.05) (23.52) (34.34) (36.79) 
       
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 
R-squared 0.028 0.040 0.064 0.135 0.059 0.093 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
       
* All models estimated using county fixed effects and controlling for population density, unemployment, vote-
share, and income 
 The results from estimating the effects of disaster damage on other spending categories 
did not produce any statistically significant results.  These results suggest that disaster damage in 
the current fiscal year is associated with decreases in per capita spending for recreation and 
culture as well as administration.  Furthermore, the results suggest that each dollar in per capita 
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damage in the previous fiscal year is associated with a $0.17 per capita increase in roads and 
transportation spending per capita in the current fiscal year. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 To summarize the significant results from my preferred specifications (FEMA PA funds 
per capita as the explanatory variable, year fixed effects included); 
• Disaster damage in the previous fiscal year is associated with an increase in total receipts 
per capita in the current fiscal year. 
• There is no statistically significant relationship between disaster damage and total 
spending per capita. 
• Disaster damage is associated with a decrease in tax revenues in the current fiscal year 
and an increase in intergovernmental revenues in the following fiscal year. 
• Disaster damage is associated with a decrease in recreation and culture spending per 
capita in the current fiscal year and an increase in transportation spending per capita in 
the following fiscal year.  
 These results raise a few questions.  The first being, are county governments increasing 
their surplus because of disasters?  When estimating a model where the dependent variable is 
surplus per capita, the explanatory variable is FEMA PA funds per capita, and year fixed effects 
are included, the are not statistically significant.  Therefore, this analysis does not present 
compelling evidence that counties are increasing their surplus as a result of disasters. 
 The second question concerns economic significance.  When looking at the results, it is a 
little unclear what the magnitude of the results is.  Let us begin by quantifying the effect of 
damage on total receipts.  The point estimate suggests that total receipts increase by $0.93 for 
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each dollar in per capita FEMA PA funds in the previous fiscal year.  This amounts to a $9.33 
per capita increase in total receipts for an average level of previous-year damage.  Given that the 
average level of per capita receipts is $580, this is roughly a 1.6% increase in per capita receipts 
due to an average level of damage.  
 Let us now consider the magnitude of changes in taxes and intergovernmental revenues.  
The point estimate for the average decrease in tax revenues resulting from one dollar in current 
year damage is -0.04.  For an average level of damage, this is a $0.4 per capita decrease in tax 
revenues.  Given that the average level of per capita tax revenues is $140, this amounts to a 
trivial decrease in tax revenues.  The point estimate for the average increase in intergovernmental 
revenues resulting from one dollar in previous year damage is 0.22.  For an average level of 
damage, this is a $2.20 increase in intergovernmental revenues.  Given that the average level of 
per capita intergovernmental revenues is $220, this amounts to a 1% increase in 
intergovernmental revenues.   
 It is important to note that the $2.20 increase in intergovernmental revenues only 
accounts for a portion of the $9.33 increase in total receipts per capita attributable to an average 
level of disaster damage in the previous year.  The remaining portion of the increase must come 
from some combination of insurance, donations, and other sources not considered by this study.  
It is also possible that this gap is partially accounted for by an increase in borrowing despite the 
lack of statistical significance in my estimates. 
 We should also specify the magnitudes of effects on spending categories so that we can 
compare the increase in receipts with changes in spending.  For each dollar of current-year PA 
per capita, recreation and culture spending decreases by $0.01 per capita on average.  For an 
average level of damage, this amounts to a $0.10 decrease.  Given that the average level of per 
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capita recreation and culture spending is $12.25, this equates to a trivial decrease in rec and 
cultures spending of less than 1%.  Each dollar of per capita PA in the previous fiscal year is 
associated with a $0.17 increase in roads and transportation spending in the current fiscal year.  
For an average amount of damage, this is a $1.70 increase in transportation spending.  Given that 
the average amount of transportation spending is $88.71 per capita this amounts to a roughly 2% 
increase in transportation spending. 
 The results of this study are somewhat encouraging in that they suggest that the effects of 
disasters on local government budgets are not large.  The small changes induced by average 
levels of disaster damage should be reasonably manageable by local governments given the 
amount of assistance available from the state and federal government.  It should be noted, 
however, that the average amount of per capita disaster damage is $10 per capita.  If we were to 
consider the effects when disaster damage is much higher (maximum of $496.35), the effects of 
disasters will be much larger.  As an extension to this study, it may be useful to identify a better 
measure of disaster magnitude or damage to determine the reliability of these findings.   
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